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Abstract 
This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the reasons why women endure 
longer unemployment durations than men in post-restructuring urban China using data 
obtained from a national representative household survey. Rejecting the view that women are 
less earnest than men in their desire for employment, the analysis shows that women’s job 
search efforts are handicapped by lack of access to social networks, social stereotyping (that 
married women are unreliable employees), unequal access to social reemployment services 
stemming from sex segregation prior to the displacement, and wage discrimination in the 
post-restructuring labor market. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past decade, China’s public enterprises underwent dramatic labor retrenchment. 
The public sector restructuring has brought an end to the era of “cradle-to-grave” socialism 
and lifetime employment for Chinese state workers. While industrial restructuring is an 
inevitable feature of market transition, the reform has affected men and women differently. 
Studies have documented that women have been laid off at much higher rates than men and 
experienced greater difficulty seeking reemployment (Appleton, et. al, 2002; Giles et al, 2006). 
The deterioration of the employment status of women has made the feminization of urban 
poverty a real possibility in post-restructuring China. The rising gender inequality in paid 
employment affects the well-being of not only women themselves but also their family, given 
the evidence from a diverse set of countries that increasing a woman’s share of income in the 
household significantly increases the share of the household budget allocated to children’s 
education, health, and nutrition-related expenditures (King et al, 2001). The incidence of 
poverty will therefore be more likely to transfer from one generation to another through the 
declining investment in education and health. Gender discrimination in labor markets also 
creates new resource misallocation issues in that highly productive female workers are 
unemployed or forced to leave the labor force altogether. Despite the profound impacts, the 
gender implications of industrial restructuring have not received adequate attention from 
economists and policy-makers in China. 
In this paper, we examine the determinants of gender differences in unemployment 
spells in urban China using a nation-wide household survey undertaken in 2003. While 
gender differentials in wages and labor force participation have been the focus of much 
research, studies on gender and unemployment rates are scarce. A handful of researchers 
documented the gender disparity in unemployment rates in transition countries but none have 
investigated further the underlying causes for this stylized fact (Ham et al, 1999; Appleton, et. 
al, 2002; Cai et al, 2006). To be sure, Ham, et. al. (1999) use the Oaxaca decomposition 
method to analyze the extent to which the gender difference in unemployment durations is 
attributable to observable characteristics and to regression coefficients in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. But they do not offer an explanation as to why the effects of observed  
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characteristics differ between men and women. In this paper, we apply a duration regression 
model to investigate the main reasons why women’s unemployment spells are longer than 
men’s. We evaluate the extent to which the gender disparity in unemployment durations is 
attributable to labor market structural and other institutional factors and to observed individual 
characteristics using the Oaxaca decomposition technique. Our paper provides the first 
systematic analysis of the gender difference in unemployment durations in transition 
countries. A better understanding of the causes of gender disparities in unemployment is of 
critical importance for designing gender-sensitive public policies and seeking 
gender-equitable solutions for urban unemployment. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of 
labor market reforms and changes in women’s employment. We lay out the conceptual 
framework and review related literature in the section 3. In section 4 we describe empirical 
methodologies. Data and descriptive statistics are presented in section 5. Section 6 
discusses the regression results of unemployment duration determination. Section 7 presents 
the findings from the Oaxaca decomposition analysis of unemployment duration by gender. 
The final section summarizes the main results and discusses their policy implications. 
2.  Labor Market Reforms and Women’s Employment 
During the pre-reform period, China’s urban labor market was known as “iron rice 
bowl”; the majority of working-age people were employed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and work units provided state workers with a job for life as well as a wide range of benefits 
and welfare from subsidized housing, education, healthcare to retirement pensions. While the 
full employment policy served the purpose of providing social security to urban workers, the 
rigid labor regime had made over-staffing a typical feature of SOEs.   
Under central planning, women’s full participation in the labor force played a key role 
in the Chinese leadership’s attempt to reduce gender inequality in society. As a result, most 
working-age women were employed on a full-time basis in SOEs and had equal entitlements 
with their male colleagues, from lifetime guaranteed employment to enterprise-provided 
welfare and benefits. With the official policy of equal pay for equal work, the gender wage gap  
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in pre-reform China was remarkably small by international standards.
1  
Despite the significant advancements given to Chinese women during the socialist 
transformation, the position of women in the labor market remained worse than that of men. 
Gender segregation was prevalent in the workplace. Women were over-represented in 
collective enterprises which offered lower wages and fewer benefits than state firms. Women 
were also more concentrated in those industries that traditionally have higher female intensity, 
such as manufacturing, trade, and social services, but occupied disproportionately fewer 
positions in government agencies. With respect to occupational hierarchy, women were more 
likely to be placed in positions that had less autonomy and decision-making power and fewer 
opportunities for skill training and career advancements (Ngo, 2002). Moreover, the economy 
under central planning was dominated by capital-intensive heavy industries which are 
traditionally regarded as a male-dominated sector. The irrational economic structure further 
crowded women into overstaffed clerical and low-level administrative occupations, making 
unskilled female workers vulnerable to redundancy. 
China began its gradual transition to a market-oriented economy in the late 1970s. 
Early efforts to reform SOEs focused on restructuring the incentives of workers and 
managers, encouraging the development of non-state sectors, fostering market competition, 
promoting manufacturing exports, and attracting foreign investment. The emergence of 
township and village enterprises, small businesses, self-employment, joint ventures, and 
foreign firms had led to a sharp decline in the share of the state sector in industrial output, 
putting great pressure on state managers to eliminate their superfluous workforce. Up until 
the early 1990s, however, the managers of SOEs were not allowed to dismiss workers as the 
government continued to rely on state employment to buffer urban workers against massive 
open unemployment. Thus, and not surprisingly, empirical studies show that 20 to 40 per cent 
of workers in state firms were redundant, and nearly a half of SOEs endured financial losses 
in the early 1990s (Li and Xiu, 2001; Dong and Putterman, 2003). 
                                                        
1 Kidd and Meng (2000) find that female workers in Chinese state enterprises earned around 86 
percent of the average wage received by men in 1981 and the ratio rose slightly to 87percent in 1987. 
As a point of reference, the cross-country average nonagricultural earnings ratio of female to male is 
0.73; it is 0.76 in the United States, 0.57 in South Korea, and 0.51 in Japan (Jacobsen, 1998, p350).    
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The pace of market reforms greatly accelerated after Deng Xiaoping’s famous 
southern tour and the 14
th Communist Party Congress in 1992. In late 1992, the central 
government endorsed formally private property rights and initiated ownership reforms to 
state-owned enterprises. In consequence, a large number of SOEs were transformed into 
joint-stock companies, gone bankrupt, merged with other enterprises, or sold to private 
individuals. In 1994, a new Labor Law was passed sanctioning the right of employers to 
dismiss workers. In 1997, newly elected Premier Zhu Rongji announced a large-scale labor 
retrenchment program in an attempt to reverse the money-losing trends of SOEs within a 
three-year period. Since then, millions of workers in the public sector have been separated 
from their jobs. 
Since the mid-1980s, a series of reform measures had been introduced in the areas of 
pension, healthcare, housing, and social assistance in an attempt to transfer the 
responsibility of social services and protection from enterprises to the state and individuals 
(Fan, Lunati and O’Connor, 1998). Under new welfare schemes, all employers and 
employees were required by law to make contributions to several separate funds: pension, 
industrial accident, maternity, unemployment, and medical insurance. Despite these reforms, 
efforts to de-link the social security system from individual enterprises had met limited 
success. Hence, to soften the social impact of public sector downsizing, workers in SOEs 
who were discharged from their posts were allowed to retain their link with their former 
enterprise. This practice is described in Chinese by the term xiagang, and emerged as the 
principal means of labor retrenchment. The SOEs set up re-employment service centers 
(RSCs) to manage the xiagang. RSCs provided the basic living allowance to xiagang workers, 
paid premiums on pension, unemployment, and health insurance for these workers, and also 
provided them with training and job replacement services. Xiagang workers were allowed to 
stay registered with the RSC for a maximum of three years. The RSC program targeted 
primarily displaced state workers, which led to a large disparity in xiagang benefits between 
SOEs and other types of urban enterprise.
2 A fact in China’s labor market was that women 
                                                        
2 For instance, in 1999 more than 95 percent of xiagang workers in SOEs entered RSCs with 79 
percent of them receiving the full amount of living subsidies. By contrast, only less than one-third to 
one-fifth of their counterparts in collectives and other types of enterprises had access to respective 
programs (Dong, 2003).  
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were disproportionately allocated in collectives and under-represented in SOEs before the 
reforms took place. The practice that unemployment benefits skewed in favor of those 
employed in SOEs results in unequal access to social assistance for female unemployed 
workers, which is expected to have a gender differentiated impact on the incentives and 
ability of displaced workers to find reemployment. 
[Table 1] 
Table 1 reveals the changes in urban employment following the public sector 
restructuring. As can be seen from that table, the employment of SOEs fell from its peak of 
109.6 million in 1995 to 69.2 million in 2002, down by 37 percent, and more than 20 million 
positions in the collectives were also eliminated. While employment by firms under other 
ownership categories rose by about 17 million during the period, the public sector downsizing 
led to a net reduction of 43.5 million in urban formal employment. Labor retrenchment has 
dramatically changed the landscape of urban labor markets with the employment share of 
public firms (state enterprises and collectives combined) falling from 75.6 per cent in 1995 to 
33.4 per cent in 2002. 
The statistics on the changes in the sex composition of urban employment show that 
the share of women’s employment dropped marginally, from 39.5 percent in 1995 to 38.5 
percent in 2002 (see Table 1). The structural changes in the economy that shift the 
composition of demand for output towards sectors that are traditionally over-represented by 
women appear to be instrumental in minimizing the net job losses for women. Indeed, while 
the share of women’s employment declined in the mining, manufacturing, and construction 
industries which were experiencing employment contraction, women accounted for a large 
share of the new jobs created by financial and non-financial service sectors and government 
organizations during the period of restructuring. However, there is a noticeable decline in the 
proportion of women in urban collectives and other ownership types. This result suggests that 
women assumed a disproportionate share of lay offs in the collectives and experienced more 
difficulty seeking employment in the emerging private sector. 
[Figure 1] 
The public sector restructuring has resulted in a sharp increase in open  
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unemployment in urban centers. Figure 1 presents the statistics on the gender composition of 
unemployment obtained from the 2000 National Census and the 2003 Urban Household 
Survey undertaken by N.B.S.
3 As can be seen from the table, the unemployment rate of 
women was higher and grew faster than that of men—from 9.0 per cent for women and 7.6 
per cent for men in 2000 to 12.7 per cent for women and 8.2 per cent for men in 2003. The 
pattern of gender differences varies by age. For the 16-24 age groups that were hardest hit 
for men as well as women, male unemployment rates were higher than female rates. In the 
25-49 age groups, female unemployment rates were higher than the male rates and grew 
faster. These results reveal the gender differences in the primary reasons for unemployment. 
Men appear to have slightly more difficulty finding employment upon graduation from schools; 
in contrast, women’s unemployment was more likely due to the difficulty of finding 
reemployment after a lay off. 
In the remaining sections of the paper, we investigate the reasons as to why it is more 
difficult for unemployed women to re-enter the labor market than their male counterparts. 
3.  Conceptual Framework and Related Literature 
We apply job search theory to analyze the gender disparity in unemployment 
durations. In accordance with this theory, the probability that an unemployed worker finds 
reemployment during a given period is determined by two other probabilities--the probability 
that the worker receives a job offer and the probability that such an offer is accepted (Stigler, 
1962; Narendranathan et. al, 1985; McCall, 1988). The possibility of receiving a job offer is 
determined primarily by such factors as the worker’s human capital endowment, job search 
efforts, access to social network, macroeconomic indicators that affect labor demand, and 
employers’ sex preference. The unemployed worker decides whether to accept or reject a job 
offer by comparing the wage offer with the reservation wage. While the wage offer shares the 
same determinants of the probability of receiving a job offer, the reservation wage is a 
function of such factors as pre-displacement wages, income from non-labor private sources, 
unemployment benefits, and demographic characteristics of the household associated with 
                                                        
3 The unemployed include both laid-off workers in state firms and urban collectives who remain 
unemployed and registered unemployment.  
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the opportunity cost of employment. Given the distribution of the wage offers, the 
unemployed worker who has a high reservation wage and sticks to it may have to wait longer 
before a sufficiently high wage offer arrives (Stigler, 1962). Therefore, any factor that affects 
the reservation wages will alter the possibility that the worker accepts the job offer. 
How the aforementioned factors may influence reemployment rates of men and 
women is not all self evident. We discuss the gender implications of some main determinants 
of unemployment spells by reviewing related literature below. 
Human capital endowments 
Human capital characteristics serve as a signal of desirable or undesirable worker 
traits to a new firm (Maxwell, 1989) and those who are considered with higher human capital 
can get more job offers from the employers, ceteris paribus. The job seekers who are better 
educated and more experienced are also more effective in job search. Thus, women would 
receive less job offers than men if they had lower educational attainment and/or less work 
experience. However, the signaling effects of human capital characteristics are arguably 
stronger for women since employers are often more skeptical of women’s competence and 
job commitment. Hence, better indicators for education and labor market attachment should 
help women overcome statistical discrimination by employers. Studies indeed show that 
education increases rates of reemployment more for women than for men (Ham et al, 1999; 
Ollikainen, 2006). 
Job search efforts and family responsibilities 
Women are often perceived to be less serious than men about getting wage 
employment largely because of family responsibilities. Using a small sample of Israeli 
workers, Kulik (2000) finds that at all levels of education, men spend more time searching for 
work than women as they consider the state of unemployment as more stigmatic; in contrast, 
women are more likely to reject job offers when they were in conflict with family duties. Cai, 
Giles and Park (2006) also find that household demographic characteristics have significant 
impacts on reemployment rates for xiagang women but not for men. Johnson (1983) argues 
that a part of the gender differential in unemployment rates is attributable to the definition and 
methodology used in deriving unemployment, which tends to overstate women’s  
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unemployment rates by counting the inactive as the unemployed. However, the findings 
obtained from a large sample for OECD countries by Azmat, Guell and Manning (2006) reject 
the conventional skepticism of women’s desire for employment. This study demonstrates that 
unemployment and inactivity are distinct labor market states for both men as well as women 
and hence the gender differential in unemployment rates reflects the true prospects of wage 
employment. The study also shows that the distribution of job search methods adopted 
among men and women in OECD countries is strikingly similar, which refutes the contention 
that women are less serious job seekers compared to men. 
Access to social networks 
It is widely recognized that personal connections facilitate job search (Krauth, 2004). 
In the post-reform China, people increasingly relied on connections (guanxi) to advance their 
positions in the labor market (Walder 1986; Bian, 1994). Access to social networks is 
particularly important for laid off employees from public sectors since most of them had spent 
their entire working life with a single employer at the time of displacement and had little social 
contact outside their work units. Not surprisingly, Cai, Giles and Park (2006) find that 
reemployment rates are lower for those who have less working-age siblings in 
post-restructuring urban China. Feminist scholars have long contended that gender 
segregation and domestic responsibilities have excluded women from powerful social 
connections, which hinder women’s position in the labor market (Timberlake, 2005). In a case 
study in Nanjing city, Liu (2007) finds that women who had more restricted access to social 
networks were more vulnerable to redundancy and experienced more hardship in finding a 
new job after the displacement. Women have to search longer than men due to their limited 
social connections. 
Marriage is known to be an important channel through which people gain access to 
social networks. Becker (1973) argues that optimal mating tends to match with the individuals 
with similar characteristics such as education and other labor market characteristics. 
Theodosius (2002) presents evidence supportive of Beck’s "selective mating" hypothesis, 
which shows that if one partner is jobless then the other partner is likely to be jobless as well. 
Thus, the unemployment status of other family members provides a proxy for social  
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connections. However, how this variable may affect the probability of reemployment for men 
and women can not be deduced logically because “selective mating” works in the same way 
for both men and women. 
Structural changes in the economy 
As we mentioned earlier, economic reforms and trade liberalization have shifted the 
composition of aggregate demand for output away from capital-intensive heavy industries to 
labor-intensive light industries and services. In China, the employment share of tertiary 
industry has increased from 21.2 percent in 1993 to 29.3 percent in 2003.
4  The expansion of 
the service sector helped to dampen the adverse effect of public sector downsizing on 
women; hence it should be more beneficial for the female unemployed to gain reemployment 
in services. 
Employers’ preference 
The employers may hesitate to hire women because of their perception that women, 
especially married women, are less flexible, less mobile, or less competent despite their human 
capital characteristics. Azmat, Guell and Manning (2006) find a positive correlation between the 
gender differential in unemployment rates and the proportion of the people who agreed with the 
statement “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” among 
OECD countries. They argue that it is less costly for employers to act out their prejudice in 
recruitment when unemployment is high and there are more suitable job applicants competing 
for any position. In line with this view, Saget (2000) finds that gender inequality in employment 
was higher in the regions where the economy experienced negative growth in several Central 
and Eastern European countries. 
Pre-displacement wages 
The pre-displacement wage is an important determinant of the reservation wage, 
which has a negative effect on the willingness of a job seeker to accept a job offer. However, 
the sensitivity of the job seeker to the pre-displacement wage is determined by how it is 
compared with post-displacement wage offers. Maxwell and D’Amic (1986) analyze the 
gender implications of displacement from two perspectives. From the human capital model of 
                                                        
4  Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2004).  
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labor markets, a worker who has general human capital skills endures less wage losses from 
the lay off than a worker whose skills are heavily weighted with firm-specific human capital; as 
a result, the former is more likely to accept a job offer and end the state of unemployment 
soon than the latter for given levels of pre-displacement wages. It is often argued that women 
are inclined to invest in general skilled human capital due to their periodic participation in the 
labor force, whereas men, with continuous attachment to the labor market, invest heavily in 
firm-specific skills. Thus, other things being equal, the pre-displacement wage is expected to 
have weaker negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment for women than men 
because the post-displacement wage relative to the pre-displacement wage is higher for 
women than for men. 
The institutional perspective stresses that workers who are separated from the sector 
paying economic rents suffer more wage losses than those who are displaced from 
competitive sectors because the pre-displacement wage overstates market worth for the 
former. Public sector downsizing hit women harder than men because women would not only 
lose the wage premiums paid to state workers as would their male co-workers but would also 
likely to face wage discrimination when seeking employment in the emerging private sector. 
For a given pre-displacement wage rate, a woman would wait longer and search harder than 
a man in order to obtain a wage offer that meets her expectation. 
Empirical studies for mature market economies offer little support for the human 
capital conjecture. Instead, the finding that is consistent with the prediction of the institutional 
school that women suffered more wage losses after the displacement has been obtained by 
several researchers (Maxwell, 1986; Madden, 1987; Crossley, 1994). The contention that 
women accumulate less firm-specific human capital than men is surely not a plausible 
depiction of the labor market in China. The majority of women in urban China entered the 
labor force right after graduation and have demonstrated a remarkably strong attachment to 
the labor market, as unveiled by Meng (1999) and Dong, et. al.(2006). Hence, the institutional 
perspective is more enlightening for predicting the gender implications of pre-displacement 
earnings in transition countries. From a firm-level dataset for Chinese industry in the late 
1990s, Zhang and Dong (2006) find that women in SOEs received wage subsidies whereas  
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women in private firms suffered wage discrimination. Using the same survey data adopted by 
this article, Du and Fan (2005) compared the wage structures and employment patterns of 
laid-off workers before and after the displacement and found that the magnitude of wage 
discrimination has increased and occupational segregation has become more severe.
5 
These results indicate that women were undergoing a larger downward adjustment in 
remunerations following the labor reshuffling from the state to the private sector. Hence, we 
expect that women have a stronger negative employment response to the pre-displacement 
wage relative to men. 
Income supports from public and private sources 
Social assistance for the unemployed and non-earned household income increase the 
reservation wage and consequently have a negative effect on the workers’ desire to end the 
state of unemployment. The incentive effect of unemployment benefits has been the subject 
of much research. Ham, Svejnar and Terrell (1999) find that unemployment benefits have 
only a moderate effect on the duration of unemployment of both men and women in Czech 
and Slovak. Cai, Giles and Park (2006) show that access to social income assistance 
contributes significantly to reducing reemployment rates of laid off workers in China in the late 
1990s. Logically, women would be more sensitive to income supports than men had they 
been less committed to the labor market.   
Active labor policies and gender segregation 
The main obstacles to laid-off public workers’ reentry to the labor market are their lack 
of skills and labor market experience necessary for filling newly created positions. Hence, 
public reemployment services such as skills training, job search assistance, and employment 
counseling play a pivotal role in addressing the structural/frictional problems facing laid-off 
workers. As mentioned in the previous section, however, the benefits of active labor policies 
were accessed primarily by state workers, while women were crowded into the collective 
sector. Unequal access to reemployment services would create more hardship for female 
                                                        
5 The results from Du and Fan (2005) show that the proportion of the gender wage gap not explained 
by observable characteristics—a measure of discrimination—increased from 93 percent in 
pre-displacement to more than 100 percent after reemployment. Based on the multilogit regression 
estimates, about 8 percent of the female reemployed should have held white-collar jobs while taking 
blue-collar jobs; in contrast, about 10 percent of the male reemployed took white-collar positions while 
they should have been in blue-collar occupations.  
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workers displaced from the collective sector. 
Based on the discussion above, our analysis seeks to test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Women are less earnest than men about finding reemployment. We test this 
hypothesis by comparing the gender patterns of job search efforts and responses to domestic 
responsibilities and income supports from both public and private sources. The absence of 
behavior dissimilarity between men and women in these areas rejects the skepticism about 
women’s desire for employment and suggests that unemployment is as much an involuntary 
state to women as it is to men. 
Hypothesis 2: The reemployment rate of women is lower than that of men as a result 
of women’s lack of access to social networks. We test this hypothesis by exploring the 
male-female differences in party membership, employment status of other adult family 
members, reemployment response to the two variables listed above, and effectiveness of 
friends and relatives as job search mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 3: Female workers in the collective sector have lower reemployment rates 
than their sisters in the state sector because of unequal access to reemployment services. 
We test this hypothesis by looking at the effects of ownership type of former employers, 
holding other factors constant. 
Hypothesis 4: Discrimination against women is an underlying cause of the gender gap 
in the length of unemployment spells. It is always difficult to test sex discrimination in labor 
market outcomes. Following the discrimination literature, we introduce a gender indicator and 
estimate its effect while controlling for endowments and other explanatory variables. We test 
sex discrimination further by comparing the effects of pre-displacement wages for men and 
women. A larger ceteris paribus effect of the pre-displacement wage for women is indicative 
of the presence of gender discrimination in the labor market. 
4. Empirical  Framework 
We use a duration model to analyze the determinants of unemployment spells (Kiefer, 
1988; Nickell, 1979; Lancaster, 1979, Narendranathan et. al., 1985; Meyer, 1990). Let us 
denote  h(t)dt the hazard function in period t of the unemployment spell, which is the  
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probability that individual i will leave unemployment during the period (t, t+dt) based on the 
condition that the person has been unemployed for t periods. The conditional probability of 
leaving unemployment is the product of the probability that worker i receives a job offer during 
(t, t+dt) and the probability that such an offer is accepted. 
The hazard function of leaving unemployment is written as  ] ), ( [ ) ( t t X h t h = , where 
X is a vector of the underlying determinants of the probability of receiving a job offer and the 
probability of accepting a job offer during (, ) tt d t + , which are described below. Human 
capital characteristics are measured by education, experience, health status, and 
pre-displacement occupation. Variables for party membership, job search channels, and the 
presence of another unemployed adult in the household are used to proxy job search efforts 
and social networks. Regional rate of growth in GDP, share of tertiary industry in GDP, and 
unemployment rate are introduced to control for aggregate labor demand. The proxy 
variables for the reservation wage include pre-displacement wages, ownership types of the 
former employers, unemployment benefits, earnings of other family members, property 
income, household demographic characteristics, and marital status.   
We assume that the unemployment spell follows the Weibull distribution
6 and write 
the regression model of unemployment duration as: 
1 ] )' ( exp[ ) ), ( (
− =
α α β t t X t t X h , α  >   0           ( 1 )  
Where β is a vector of regression parameters and α is the indicator of how the hazard 
function is changing with respect to duration, that is, in the cases where  1 α > ,  1 α < , and 
1 α = , the conditional probability of re-employment is increasing, decreasing or independent 
of unemployment duration.   
In this model, the expected mean duration of unemployment for time invariant 
explanatory variables X is given by: 
                                                        
6 Because Weibull specification only allows for hazard rates that monotonically increase or decrease 
with duration, we also estimate the Cox’s proportional hazards model (a semi-parametric duration 
model) to test the robustness of the results. The results from Cox’s regression are presented in the 
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Where  () Γ⋅is the standard Gamma distribution function. The elasticity of expected 
duration with respect to a variable which enters the hazard function in logs is the negative of 
the corresponding element of β divided by α. 
One shortcoming of the hazard function (1) is that it does not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. To deal with the problem, we apply the method introduced by Narendranathan 
et al, (1985) and estimate the following equation:   
1 [ , ] [ , | ] exp( ) vi i i hXt h Xtv X t v
α βα
− ′ ==            ( 3 )  









Γ , where the 
mean of ν is equal to 1 and the variance of ν, σ2, is  γ
1
. We test the hypothesis of the 
absence of unobserved,  0 σ = , using the Chi-square statistics. The expected duration with 
unobserved heterogeneity is derived by the same formula described by equation (2).   
Using equations (1) and (3), we explore empirically the underlying causes of the 
gender gap in unemployment durations for the remainder of the paper. 
5.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used by this paper are derived from the Unemployment and Reemployment 
Survey conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics in December 2003. The National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China adopts the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) 
definition of unemployment with only minor revisions. According to this definition, those who 
were not employed during the last week, and who have used at least one of the search 
channels for seeking a job during the last three months, and were available to start work 
within two weeks, were considered as unemployed. The re-employed comprises of those who 
have worked for pay (including both formal and informal sectors) at least one hour during the 
last week, and suffered unemployment at least one time during the past three years. The 
survey covers 17 major municipalities and provinces, namely, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi,  
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Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Guangdong, Hubei, Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Yunnan, Guizhou, and Gansu. Except for Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing, three cities are 
selected from each province, which include the capital of a province, a medium-sized, and a 
small-sized city. Within each city, urban-registered households are selected using stratified 
random sampling methods.   
The sample used by this paper consists of urban residents aged between 16 and 60 
for men and 16 and 50 for women who had experienced involuntary unemployment in the 
past 3 years prior to the survey time in 2003. In the survey, the age difference by gender 
takes into account the impact of China’s gender- differentiated retirement policies. China’s 
official retirement age is 55 for women and 60 for men. During the economic restructuring 
period, workers were allowed to take early retirement five years earlier than the official 
retirement age and many public enterprises used mandatory early retirement as a means to 
streamline the workforce. The sample includes women only up to the age of 50 to minimize 
the possibility of inactive women being counted as unemployed, while admittedly the 10-year 
age difference between men and women in the sample may lead to an underestimation of the 
plight of laid-off female workers relative to their male counterparts.   
The sample has a total of 2,573 observations, of which 1,008 were re-employed and 
1,565 remained unemployed at the time when the survey was done. For those who have 
experienced unemployment more than once, only the spell of the latest unemployment is 
recorded. As a result, we have no information on multiple unemployment spells. Due to the  
survey design, the sample includes those who had been laid off before 2000 and remained 
unemployed afterwards but excludes incidentally those who had found reemployment and 
never been laid off again before 2000; as a result, the full sample is likely to overstate the 
mean duration of unemployment. To check the sensitivity of estimates to the potential right 
side censoring, we construct two samples; one including all observations and one including 
only those who were laid off after 1997, the year when the public sector downsizing was 
launched, and call the former “the full sample” and the latter “the sample after 1997”. 
Excluding the observations with missing information on unemployment duration, we have 
2,291 observations for the full sample and 2,102 observations for the sample after 1997.  
18 
The explanatory variables are defined as follows. Education is measured by years of 
schooling that are derived from education attainments with 6 years for primary school, 9 for 
junior high, 12 for senior high school, 15 for college graduates (dazhuan), 16 for university 
graduates and 19 for postgraduates. The variable for pre-displacement experience is derived 
by subtracting age by the sum of 6, years of schooling and years of unemployment. Dummy 
variables for personal characteristics are defined as an indicator for the worker who has 
communist party membership; is married; is in good health; was a blue-collar worker prior to 
the lay off; and has more than one adult unemployed in the family. We classify managers, 
technicians, and engineers as white collar employees and clerical staff, service, manufacturer 
factory workers and others as blue collar workers.
7 The age distribution of children is 
measured by a set of binary indicators with the category of having no children as the 
benchmark. The category of “child age0-3” is combined with “child age 4-6” because there 
are only 51 observations in the former category. The ownership type of former employer and 
job search channels is also measured by dummy variables with SOE as the benchmark for 
the former and government job replacement services for the latter.   
Earnings of other family members, non-labor income, unemployment benefits, and 
pre-displacement earnings are all measured in RMB yuan per month. Unemployment 
benefits (UB) in the paper include both unemployment insurance payment and xiagang living 
allowance. However, the survey provides information on unemployment benefits only for 
those who remained unemployed when the survey was conducted. As a way out, we derived 
the value of unemployment benefits for those who were reemployed from the estimates of the 
regression, with the dependant variable of UB on experience, education attainment, 
pre-displacement occupation, ownership type of the former employer, industry, job search 
channel, and regional location for the unemployed workers. The amount of UB varies across 
the regional location, depending on the tax revenue of local government. Another important 
property of the UB is that it increases as time goes by. The value of UB for the re-employed 
from the regression of currently un-employed was therefore at a high risk of being 
                                                        
7 Considering Clerical staff as a blue collar occupation instead of a white collar, we follow the 
occupation classification adopted by the Urban Survey Team of China National Bureau of Statistics 
(see China’s Urban Household Survey Handbook, 2002, p 36).  
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over-predicted. The sensitivity of re-employment rate with respect to UB is thus more likely to 
be under-estimated. We substitute access to UB (being 1 if UB is more than zero; otherwise, 
0) for the amount of UB
8, the coefficients of other variables being similar, which implies that 
the under-estimation is not a serious problem. All the other variables for personal and 
household characteristics are obtained from the survey.   
Variables for annual rates of growth in GDP and share of tertiary industry in GDP by 
city are obtained from China Statistics Yearbook, 2003 and China City Statistics Yearbook, 
2003. Unemployment rates by province are calculated using information obtained from the 
Urban Household Survey,
9  which is a regular survey by N.B.S., China. 
[Table 2] 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the employment status of workers in the 
sample after 1997.
10 We note that women take a disproportionately large share of the 
unemployed and a small share of the re-employed, and that unemployment durations are 
long for both sexes but are much longer for women. Specifically, of the 2,102 unemployed, 
only 881 (41.8%) are re-employed and the average unemployment durations are about 18 
months for the entire sample, 13 months for the re-employed, and 21 months for those still 
unemployed. With respect to gender differences, we find that female workers make up about 
59 percent of the unemployed, 18 percentage points higher than the share for men, whereas 
their share in reemployment is only 56 percent. Moreover, the mean length of unemployment 
spells for women is 2 months longer than that for men. Both the unemployment duration and 
the incidence of re-employment are just based on the descriptive statistics, while the 
discrimination literature (Becker, 1957) clearly points to the importance of controlling for 
differences in endowments (such as education) when comparing men and women. In fact, an 
important contribution that we make in this paper is the measurement of differences in the 
length of men’s and women’s unemployment spells in urban China controlling for 
                                                        
8  The readers can request the results from the author. 
9  We define those who worked less than 4 hours in November 2003 as unemployed for the UHS data.   
10 We present the summary statistics of the sample that excludes those who reported to have been 
laid off prior to 1998 and still unemployed after 2000 instead of the full sample because the claim of 
such long unemployment durations is likely to be subject to reporting error. Including these 
observations would overstate the average length of unemployment spells, although, admittedly, 
excluding these observations may create a downward bias.  
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endowments and other explanatory variables. 
[Figure 2] 
To discern how the employment status of workers in the sample changed with time, 
we calculate the inflow rates and outflow rates
11  and present the results in figure 2. We note 
that while inflow and outflow rates increased over time for both men and women, women’s 
inflow rates are higher, with due cause, except for the years 2002 and 2003, and outflow rates 
are always lower. These results further confirm the fact that unemployed women have to 
endure more difficulty in finding a new job.   
[Table 3] 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of personal and household characteristics of men 
and women in the sample. The statistics on education, experience, and health show no 
noticeable differences in human capital endowment between men and women. Women have, 
on average, slightly more years of schooling, better health, and fewer years of job experience 
than men, indicating that gender inequality in human capital investment is not a plausible 
explanation for low reemployment rates of women in the sample. Looking at information on 
job search efforts, we note that the distribution of job search methods is fairly similar among 
men and women; the majority of the workers in the sample (nearly 80 percent) reported that 
they relied on private mechanisms for job search and the proportion of those who counted on 
friends and relatives is almost identical—43.8 percent for men and 43.7 for women. In 
addition, according to the survey, the reemployed male and female workers both spent about 
70 percent of the time during the period of unemployment to search for new jobs and the 
gender difference is statistically insignificant. There is no evidence here that the female 
unemployed are less keen on finding a new job. 
There are, however, marked gender differences in other characteristics. The ratio of 
                                                        
11 Average annual rates of the number flowing into unemployment divided by the number employed 
and multiplied by 100; Average annual rates of the number flowing out of unemployment divided by the 
number of unemployed, multiplied by 100. The number of employed is constricted to those who have 
experienced unemployment in the latest 3 years when the survey was taken on due to the lack of the 
actual employment population (from which the Unemployment and Re-employment Survey Sample is 
selected) in the 45 cities across the period from 1998 to 2002. The inflow rates are thus much too high, 
but the trend across time is right.  
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women to men is 0.77 for pre-displacement wages, 0.69 for property income, and 0.94 for 
unemployment benefits, whereas earnings of other household members are 55 percent 
higher for women than for men. Moreover, women are less likely to be party members than 
men, consistent with the view that women have weak connections to powerful social 
networks, although the proportion of those who have more than one family member 
unemployed is similar: 5.3 percent for men and 4.5 percent for women. Compared with men, 
the distribution of women over the age of children is more skewed towards the categories of 
no children or having younger children. With respect to the ownership type of former 
employers, while the majority of the workers were separated from public enterprises (SOEs 
and collectives)—59 percent for men and 61 percent for women. Women are 
over-represented in urban collective enterprises, the sector which provided fewer 
reemployment services to xiagang workers, compared to SOEs (Dong, 2003).   
In the following sections we will examine how these observed characteristics may 
influence the gendered re-employment outcomes.   
6. Results 
To depict the gender difference of re-employment probabilities, we first present the 
Kaplan-Meier Survival curves by gender using the nonparametric method (see figure 3).   
[Figure 3] 
Figure 3 shows that the unemployment probability of females is always higher than 
that of males.   
In order to identify the determinants of the gender difference, we estimate the hazard 
function of unemployment spells in (3) by Maximum Likelihood Estimation techniques using 
the STATA computer software package. The regression is first applied for a pooled sample 
and then for men and women separately, and the estimates are presented in table 4. To test 
the gender difference in regression coefficients, we also estimate the hazard function with 
additional interactive gender dummy variables with all the explanatory variables for the 
pooled sample. To simplify the presentation, we only report the estimates of gender dummy 
and its interactive terms (see Table a2). Based on the likelihood ratio tests reported at the  
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bottom of the table, all the regressions are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
[Table 4] 
We first take a look at the estimates of pooled regressions.
12  The estimates of gender 
indicators confirm that there is a significant gender gap in unemployment duration; other 
things being equal, the probability of leaving unemployment for women is only 58.4 percent of 
the probability for men using the full sample and 63.3 percent for the sample after 1997. 
Tansel et al (2004) and Oikennen (2003) draw similar conclusions in Turkey and Finland 
respectively. The other estimates of the two pooled regressions are also fairly similar. As 
expected, experience, education, and good health have significant positive effects on the rate 
of reemployment. Those who were in blue collar occupations prior to the lay offs are less 
likely to be reemployed, although the effect is statistically insignificant. While marriage has a 
significant negative effect, having young children does not appear to be an impediment for 
finding reemployment. Instead, we find that the rate of reemployment for workers with 
children aged between 0 and 6 is significantly higher than workers with no children. This 
result may be attributable to the fact that unemployment rates are higher for the younger age 
group as we showed previously, given that workers with no children are most likely to be 
young people.   
Confirming economic intuition, pre-displacement wages and unemployment benefits 
are found to decrease the hazard ratio of re-employment and the effects are significant at the 
1 percent level, although the estimates of income from private sources are insignificant. The 
estimates also indicate that the laid-offs from SOEs or collective enterprises have significantly 
lower reemployment rates relative to those from the private sector perhaps because public 
enterprises provided more income support and benefits to laid off workers than private firms, 
and/or the costs of displacement - both wage and skill losses - are higher for public 
employees than private ones. Our results are consistent with the finding by Giles, et al (2006) 
which shows that reemployment rates are lower among those who have access to social 
                                                        
12 For the convenience of interpretation, we report hazard-ratios instead of regression coefficients. 
Hazard-ratios are the coefficients relative to the reference group for dummy variables, and for 
continuous variables, the hazard-ratio for variable X is the coefficient divided by the coefficient of (X-1). 
As a result, the hazard-ratios are greater than 1when the coefficients are positive and are less than 1 




Looking at the impact of social networks, we find that party membership improves the 
prospect of reemployment significantly, whereas the probability of reemployment for those 
whose spouse or other household members are also unemployed is significantly lower. 
Compared to those who rely on governments for job search, the hazard ratios of employment 
for those who rely on relatives and friends or themselves are significantly higher. It is evident 
that private social networks are more effective than public job replacement services in helping 
laid off workers re-enter the labor market. Interestingly, contrary to our result, Appleton et. al. 
(2002) find, from a survey undertaken in the spring of 2000, that job replacement services 
provided by governments are more effective than private job search mechanisms. Given that 
our analysis uses data obtained in December 2003, the contrast between our results and 
Appleton’s is indicative of the pace of China’s moving away from an administrative regime 
towards a functioning labor market. The factors associated with local labor demand do not 
have any significant impact on re-employment. In summary, most of the estimates are 
intuitively plausible and statistically significant, which reassures the adequacy of model 
specifications. 
We next turn to examine the estimates by gender. We first take a look at the impact of 
human capital. The benefits from pre-displacement experience for men and women are quite 
similar, and there is also no significant gender difference in the effects of health status and 
pre-displacement occupation. However, education is markedly more important for women 
than men; one additional year of schooling increases the hazard ratio by 17.6 to 23.9 percent 
for women but only 4.3 to 6.0 percent for men. For both samples, the gender difference in 
education effect is significant at 1 percent level (see Table a2). This finding supports the 
conjecture that education has a stronger signaling effect for women than for men.   
With respect to domestic responsibilities, the estimates of dummy variables 
associated with children offer no evidence that reproductive responsibilities represent a 
                                                        
13 That unemployment benefits may be correlated with unobserved ability raises the concern about 
simultaneous bias. We address this concern by controlling for the pre-displacement earnings which are 
a typical proxy for unobserved ability. Following Giles, et. al. (2006), we also used a dummy for access 
to UB for the regression and the results are similar to those presented in table 4.  
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significant impediment to women more than to men since all the interactive gender dummies 
are statistically insignificant. This result is not surprising since the data we used comes from a 
special survey focusing on those who have suffered unemployment in the latest three years 
when the survey was taken. The data therefore excludes those who give up job searching 
due to personal or family reasons. Some other research (Du, et al, 2006; Du, 2006) finds that 
domestic responsibilities are responsible for women’s dramatic decline in labor force 
participation instead of the slower reemployment rate. We notice that in the gender 
disaggregated results, the re-employment for only women workers with children 0-6 is 
significantly higher than those without children. This result might signify that the employers in 
China tend not to employ young women, worrying about the deduction of their productivity 
associated with the maternity leave. The empirical results across countries on the issue are 
mixed. Ours et al (2006) and Oikennen (2003) show that females are inferior to males in the 
labor market in Slovenia and Finland, due to the family-related characteristics. Kupets (2005) 
concludes that in Ukraine, children increase women’s re-employment because of the 
expansion of informal sectors. While in Britain, dependent children decrease women’s 
re-employment to full-time jobs, while increasing women’s re-employment rates to part-time 
work (Boheim, et al, 2000).   
While neither women nor men are adversely affected by childcare responsibilities in 
China, the effects of marriage are strikingly different between men and women. The 
estimates show that marital status has no significant effect for men but has a significant 
negative effect for women, and the difference between the two estimates is highly significant 
for the full sample. Quantitatively, marriage reduces women’s probability of leaving 
unemployment by 48 to 69 percent. Lynch (1989) draws a similar result. He points out that 
married women have to suffer longer unemployment spells not due to the presence of 
children, but due to some non-labor market activities. However, he has never pointed out 
what the activities are. Given the similarity in job search intensity
14 and response to 
reproductive responsibilities between men and women, the large negative effect of marriage 
                                                        
14  The job search intensity is defined as the ratio of job search time and the whole unemployment spell. 
Laid-off males and females spent 72.23 percent and 71.02 percent, respectively, of the whole 
unemployment months on job searching.  
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does not appear to be a result of the fact that married women are less committed to wage 
employment. Instead, the evidence suggests that employers are reluctant to make job offers 
to married women because of the social stereotyping that married women are less flexible 
and less reliable employees.   
Turning to reemployment incentives, we find that income from other family members 
has a negligible negative effect on re-employment for both men and women, while property 
income has a significant negative effect for men for the sample after 1997 but an insignificant 
positive effect on women in both cases. Despite the difference in property income, the effects 
of public income support for unemployment for two sexes are almost identical—a one percent 
increase in unemployment benefits decreases the hazard ratio of re-employment by about 10 
percent. There is also no significant gender difference in reemployment response to which 
sector the workers were employed before the separation except the estimate of collectives for 
the full sample. The alikeness in men’s and women’s response to income from other family 
members and public supports and women’s insensitivity to property income offer further 
evidence that the female unemployed are as serious as the male unemployed in their desire 
for reemployment.   
The contrast between former male and female collective workers is noteworthy. The 
estimates indicate that the probability of leaving unemployment for women from collectives 
was significantly lower--by 20 percent relative to their sisters in SOEs and by 47 percent 
compared to men from the collectives. While access to social supports may offer an 
explanation as to why reemployment rates are lower among former SOE workers than private 
employees, it does not justify the plight of women laid off from collectives. Former female 
employees of collective are hardest hit by the public sector downsizing, not only by being laid 
off at higher rates but also by having the rate of reemployment. Same as their sisters in SOEs, 
former collective female workers lose the skills and social connections that were acquired 
under the planning regime, and they receive fewer reemployment services to cope with the 
changes from their former employers. The neglect of the hardship of restructuring on 
collective workers in the design of social assistance program is attributable in part to the fact 
that the sector was overrepresented by women who are voiceless in the political process. It is  
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evident that pre-displacement sex segregation continues to penalize women by hindering 
their efforts to find reemployment.   
Turning to the estimates of pre-displacement wages, we find that while the 
pre-displacement wage has significant negative effect for both men and women, the effect is 
significant larger for women than men (by 15 to 20 percent). Since the effects of former 
employers are controlled for, the large disincentive effect of the pre-displacement wage can 
only be explained by the presence of wage discrimination against women in the post-layoff 
labor market. Knight and Li (2006) do find that the earnings are higher for male re-employed 
workers both statistically significant and quantitatively important. In other words, women have 
to search harder and wait longer in order to obtain a job offer that meets their expectation.   
[Table 5] 
To further discern the sensitivity of unemployment spells to the re-employment 
incentives, we calculate the elasticities of unemployment duration and report the results in 
table 5. From the estimates, a one-percent increase in pre-displacement wages would extend 
unemployment duration by 0.189 to 0.205 percent for men and 0.335 to 0.454 percent for 
women. In contrast, the elasticity with respect to unemployment benefits for men is slightly 
higher than that for women (0.114 to 0.123 for the former versus 0.087 to 0.093 for the latter). 
Ham, et. al. (1998, 1999) estimate that the point of elasticity of unemployment spells is 0.21 
for women and 0.34 for men in the Czech Republic. Compared with their estimates, the 
negative incentive effects of public income support for unemployed workers are weaker in 
urban China than in the Czech Republic. The sensitivity of unemployment duration with 
respect to income from private sources is also rather small. 
Striking gender differences are found in marginal effects of access to social networks. 
Holding a party membership makes a significant difference in unemployment duration for 
women but has no effect for men. Quantitatively, a woman’s probability of leaving 
unemployment is 68.5 to 70.3 percent higher for a party member than a non-party member. 
While connections to powerful social networks appear to be more important for women, 
having another unemployed person in the household dramatically reduces the prospect of 
reemployment for both sexes—by 89 to 93 percent for men and 89 to 90 percent for women.  
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In addition, the estimates of dummy variables for job search channels show that assistance 
from relatives and friends is significantly more effective than public job replacement services 
for both men and women, but the social networks are significantly more helpful for men than 
women as a job search mechanism. These results suggest that access to social networks is 
particularly important for women and lack of access to social networks represents a major 
handicap for unemployed females to re-enter the labor market.   
With respect to macroeconomic indicators, the estimates show that local 
unemployment rates have a negative impact for both men and women but the effect is 
significant only for women in the full sample. While the gender difference is statistically 
insignificant, the stronger unemployment effect for women is numerically consistent with the 
conjecture that it is easier for employers to act out their prejudice against women when there 
is a queue for employment. Contrary to unemployment rates, regional economic growth rates 
have no significant impact for both sexes. Although the slack in labor demand may work to 
women’s disadvantage, the emergence of service industries appears to benefit women more 
than men. Evidently, the share of tertiary industry in GDP has a significant negative effect on 
men’s reemployment but an insignificant positive effect for women’s and the gender 
difference is statistically significant for the sample after 1997.   
It is noteworthy that the estimates of α indicate that the conditional probability of 
leaving unemployment is decreasing in unemployment duration for men (α = 0.94 or α = 
0.915) but increasing in the length of unemployment spells for women (α = 1.046 or α = 
1.084). The results for men are consistent with the findings of Lynch (1989) for young 
unemployed workers in the U.S., and with the findings of Hildreth et al (1988) in Great Britain, 
suggesting that the probability of leaving unemployment falls with the duration of spell. The 
results for women are similar to the findings obtained by Kupets (2005) for the Ukraine and 
Caputo et al (2001) for the United States, meaning that the odds ratios of reemployment 
increase with the years of unemployment. 
7.  Decomposition of Gender Differences in Unemployment Duration 
From the regressions of unemployment spells, we estimate the expected length of 
unemployment spells. The estimates indicate that the laid-off workers suffer chronic  
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unemployment with the expected unemployment duration of 51 to 55 months for women and 
45 to 47 months for men, and the predicted unemployment spells for women are 6 to 9 
months longer than that for men.
15  Theoretically, the observed gender gap in unemployment 
duration can be attributed to either differences in observable characteristics or differences in 
regression coefficients. To disentangle the sources of the gender differential in predicted 
unemployment spells, the male-female difference in unemployment duration is decomposed 
by the Oaxaca method described below: 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ [(,) (,) ] [(,) (,) ] FM FM MM FF FM ED ED ED X ED X ED X ED X ββ β β −= − + −
16 (4) 
WhereEDis the expected mean length of unemployment duration of males (M) and 
females (F) at the mean value of X of each sub-sample. The first term on the right-hand side 
of (4) captures the gender difference in unemployment duration due to the differences in 
observed characteristics between men and women. In other words, it represents the 
difference in unemployment duration between men and women if the women respond to 
changes in observable characteristics by the same manner as do men. The second term 
measures the gender differential attributable to differences in the estimated coefficients. The 
implicit assumption underlying the second term is that if the mean characteristics are identical 
across gender groups, then gender differences in unemployment spells are driven by labor 
market structural and institutional factors. This term also captures the effects of unobservable 
factors that are not equally distributed among men and women (such as, for example, 
individual tastes and preference or quality of productive attributes). It essentially represents 
the difference between female’s predicted length of unemployment spells when facing male’s 
labor market structure and female’s actual predicted unemployed duration at the mean 
characteristics of the female sample. The Oaxaca decomposition of differences in ED is 
                                                        
15  The predicted unemployment spells from our sample appear to be much longer than those in Czech 
and Slovak Republics obtained by Ham, et al (1999). A part of the difference may stem from the fact 
that Ham and his coauthors use entitlement-based data which exclude those who run out 
unemployment entitlements but remain unemployed, while our sample is not subject to such downward 
bias. 
16  The gender disparities in ED can also be presented by 
ˆˆ ˆˆ [(,) (,) ] [(,) (,) ] FM FF MF MF MM ED ED ED X ED X ED X ED X ββ ββ −= − + − . The results 
presented in table 7 are the simple average. For more details, see Ham et al, 1998.  
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presented in Table 6. 
[Table 6] 
The decomposition results show that all the difference in unemployment duration 
between women and men is due to differences in coefficients and none of it results from 
differences in explanatory variables. Specifically, if men and women faced the same market 
structure as male’s, women’s predicted mean unemployment spell would be 4.6 to 6.7 months 
shorter than men’s, given the gender differences in observed characteristics. Ham et. al. (1999) 
drew a similar conclusion that differences in regression coefficients are the major determinants 
of observed gender differences in unemployment duration in the Czech and Slovak Republics 
but offer no further explanation. Our analysis in the previous section suggests that the gender 
difference in regression estimates reflects primarily the economic and institutional constraints 
faced by the laid-off female workers rather than their preferences. In other words, women are 
disadvantaged in the post-displacement labor market by employers’ prejudice against married 
women, lack of access to social networks, unequal entitlements to social job replacement 
services, and higher costs of job separation (in terms of decreased earnings) due to 
discrimination against women in the post-restructuring labor market.   
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the gender patterns of unemployment durations in urban China 
using data derived from a recent, national representative household survey. We estimate the 
determinants of unemployment spells for men and women and analyze the sources of gender 
differences in durations of unemployment. The results confirm that laid off female workers 
have a lower probability of leaving unemployment than their male counterparts and their 
unemployment spells are longer. We test four hypotheses regarding the reasons why women 
have a longer unemployment spell than men. First, we find no evidence that women are less 
earnest than men in their desire for reemployment. Statistics show that the unemployed male 
and female workers in our sample display a considerable similarity in job search effort and 
response to domestic responsibilities and employment incentives associated with income 
supports from private as well as public sources. Secondly, our results support the conjecture 
that weak connections to social networks represent a major job search handicap for women.  
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While party membership is particularly important for women, fewer women are party 
members; using friends and relatives as a means of job search are markedly more effective 
for men than for women. Thirdly, our estimates show that women’s over representation in the 
collective sector and unequal access to reemployment services (for those who were laid off 
from the collective sector) are partly responsible for the longer unemployment duration (or 
lower re-employment probability) of women. Lastly, our findings support the hypothesis that 
employers’ prejudice is a major cause of the gender gap in unemployment durations. The 
results from our research are consistent with the hypothesis that employers use the 
stereotype and not consistent with the hypothesis that women have higher reservation wages 
due to family responsibilities or lower search efforts.   
We also find that the pre-displacement wage has significantly larger effect on women 
than men as women may endure a larger downward adjustment in remunerations following 
the labor reshuffling from the public to the private sector. Methodologically, our analysis 
shows that the gender indictor for female workers has significant negative effect on 
reemployment rates, ceteris paribus. The Oaxaca decomposition indicates that the expected 
duration of unemployment would be shorter for women than for men if the market response to 
women’s observable characteristics were the same as men’s. The effects of employers’ 
prejudice against women are so strong that women endure longer unemployment durations 
than men in spite of the finding that market response to education and economic structural 
changes works to women’s advantage.   
In addition to the findings on gender disparities, our analysis has also generated 
several important results regarding the operation of China’s urban labor market. Our 
estimates show that that public income supports for unemployment have a rather moderate 
effect on the durations of unemployment for both men and women in urban China. We also 
find that the unemployment of one family member has a significant negative effect on the 
reemployment rates of other family members. 
The results of our analysis have important policy implications. The main message is 
that policy measures must be taken to address the external constraints and structural 
features of China’s urban labor market if the state hopes to reduce gender inequality in  
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employment. Key measures include public interventions for reducing gender segmentation in 
the workplace, narrowing the gender wage gap in the emerging private sector, making active 
labor policies such as skill-training and job replacement services more widely accessible and 
more sensitive to the needs of unemployed female workers, and helping women develop 
connections to social networks. Beyond the concern about gender inequality, policies 
designed to provide a social safety net for unemployed urban workers and special assistance 
to the households with multiple unemployed members are also warranted in order to ease the 
pain borne by these workers in the face of labor market turbulence.  
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Figure 1: Urban Unemployment Rate by Gender and by Age (%), 2000 and 2003 

















Sources: * 2000 National Census, ** 2003 Urban Household Survey (UHS).   
Notes : Unemployment is defined as a person who is actively looking for a job but works less than an 
hour a week in the 2000 National Census and as a person who is actively looking for a job but works 
less than 4 hours a month in the 2003 Urban Household Survey. Some differences in unemployment 
rates between 2000 and 2003 may reflect the difference in survey design than actual time variation. 
We drop the category of “16-19” because the number of observations in the age group between 16 and 
19 is very small. 
        Male(00), Female(00): Males and females’ unemployment rate in the year of 2000; 
        Male(03), Female(03): Males and females’ unemployment rate in the year of 2003. 
Figure 2: Average inflow rates and outflow rates by year and by gender 
















Source: The Urban Unemployment and Reemployment Survey.    
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Figure 3 : Kaplan-Meier Survival estimates by gender (male is represented by 
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Notes: We use the data “Unemployed after 1997”. 
Table 1: Size and Structure of Urban Formal Employment 1995-2002
 
 1995      2002     












Overall 149.1 100.0 39.5 105.6  100.0  38.5
By ownership 
State units  109.6 73.5 37.0 69.2  65.6  37.8
Collectives 30.8 20.6 45.5 10.7  10.1  38.9
Others 8.7 5.9 49.1 25.6  24.3  40.4
By industry 
Agriculture 6.6 4.4 38.3 4.3  4.0  39.3
Mining 9.1 6.1 26.1 5.4  5.1  25.5
Manufacturing 54.4 36.5 45.6 29.1  27.5  44.1
Utility 12.2 8.1 27.6 9.9  9.4  30.0
Construction 10.5 7.1 19.6 7.6  7.2  18.1
Trade 18.3 12.3 46.9 7.3  6.9  47.5
Financial Services  8.0 5.4 44.2 8.8  8.3  47.1
Non-financial Services  19.7 13.2 46.7 22.7  21.5  48.4
Government Agencies  10.3 6.7 23.2 10.6  10.0  25.7
Source: Urban work unit employees from China Labor and Wage Statistical Yearbook, 1990, p.11 for 
1978, and China Labor Statistical Yearbook, 2003 p.15 for 1995 and 2002.   
Notes: Utility includes communication, energy, transportation, and geology and water conservancy.    
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Table 2: Unemployment durations in urban China by gender, 2003 







No. Observations  2,102 881 1,221









By gender  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
No. Observations  865 1,236 386 495 479  741















Source: The Urban Unemployment and Reemployment Survey. 
Notes: Statistics presented in this table are derived from the data “Unemployed after 1997”. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses.   
Table 3: Summary statistics of individual characteristics of the sample, by Gender 
 Male  Female  Female 
/Male    Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Continuous variables 
Years of schooling1  11.16 2.32 11.26 2.10  1.01
Experience2 21.65 11.27 19.72 8.34  0.91
Pre-displacement Earnings 
(yuan/month) 
702.33 496.44 541.50 260.92 0.77
Income of other members 
(yuan/month) 
632.05 677.62 981.84 775.42 1.55
Property income (yuan/month)  360.77 642.14 250.57 696.04  0.69
Unemployment benefits (yuan/month)  82.22 82.42 77.62 78.07  0.94
Percentage of having access to 
unemployment benefits   
45.32 0.50 42.64 0.49 0.94
Discrete variables (%) 
Party member3  14.2 0.350 8.9 0.285  0.83
Married4   77.6 0.418 88.4 0.320  1.14
Health status5    87.7 0.328 88.9 0.314  1.01
More than 1 unemployed in the 
household6 
5.32 0.225 4.45 0.206 0.84
Household demographics 
No children    10.9 0.451 12.9 0.490  1.18
Child aged 0－6 3.4 0.312 7.8 0.335  2.29
Child aged 7－18 28.4 0.180 39.9 0.268  1.40 
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Child aged 19－22 18.3 0.387 18.4 0.387  1.00
Child aged over 22  39.1 0.488 21.1 0.408  0.54
Ownership of the firm employed prior 
to lay off 
          
SOE 46.59 0.466 39.11 0.391  0.83
Collective   12.60 0.332 22.11 0.415  1.75
Private and self-employed  14.45 0.352 15.30 0.360  1.06
Foreign investment and joint venture  7.98 0.271 6.07 0.240  0.76
Others   18.38 0.388 17.41 0.379  0.95
Pre-displacement occupation             
White collar    26.54 0.424 18.18 0.366  0.69
Managerial personnel  6.94 0.254 2.10 0.144  0.30
Technicians & engineers  16.53 0.372 13.83 0.345  0.84
Blue collar  73.46 0.424 81.82 0.366  1.11
Cleric staff    12.37 0.329 16.91 0.375  1.37
Trade 10.52 0.307 17.31 0.379  1.65
Service   12.37 0.329 9.06 0.287  0.73
Manufacturing 30.40 0.460 27.02 0.444  0.89
Others   10.87 0.311 13.75 0.345  1.26
Job search channels      
Government 0.376 0.376 0.377 0.377  1.01
Labor Market    0.161 0.161 0.166 0.166  1.04
Relatives and friends  0.496 0.496 0.496 0.496  0.99
Themselves 0.463 0.463 0.466 0.466  1.022
Other 0.227 0.227 0.208 0.208  0.833
Source: The Urban Unemployment and Reemployment Survey. 
Notes: Statistics presented in this table are derived from the sample “Unemployed after 1997”. 
1. Years of Schooling are calculated from levels of education attainment with 6 years for primary school, 
9 for junior school, 12 for high school and 15 for college graduates (dazhuan), 16 for university 
graduates and 19 for postgraduates. 2. Years of pre-displacement experience are derived by 
subtracting the sum of 6, years of schooling and years of unemployment. 3. Party member is a dummy 
variable for communist party membership, Yes=1, No=0. 4. Married is a binary indicator of marriage 
status, Yes=1,No=0. 5. Health status is a dummy which is equal to one if the person is reported to have 
good health, others 0. 6. If there is more than 1 member unemployed in a household, we indicate it as 
1, others 0. 7. We combine the category of “child age0-3” with “child age 4-6” because there are only 
51 samples in the former category.    
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Table 4: Weibull regression estimates of unemployment duration 
  All observations  Unemployed after 1997 
 Pooled 
regression 






















































































Marital status and household responsibilities   




























































Reemployment incentives   



































































Table 4: Weibull regression estimates of unemployment duration (continued)   








































Access to social networks   


























Job search channels   








































































































Log likelihood  -2265.9408 -949.3419 -1279.8837 -2127.3297  -912.5322  -1187.7316
Likelihood ratio test for zero slopes   
χ
2  379.00 167.48 258.08 345.27 171.34 211.81
P value    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test of unobserved heterogeneity       
χ
2  16.57 1.67 2.19 5.04 0.47  1.68
P value    0.000 0.098 0.069 0.012 0.246  0.097
No. of observations  2134 851 1283 2071  850  1221
Notes: T statistics of the estimates are presented in parentheses. ***,** and* indicate 1, 5 and 10% 
level of significance, respectively. For dummies variables, reference groups are male, poor healthy, 
white-collar workers, not married, no children, employed in SOEs pre-displacement, non- communist 
party member, only one unemployed in one family, and relying on publicly provided job replacement 
services for job search.    
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Table 5: Elasticities of Unemployment Duration w. r. t. reemployment incentives, by 
Gender 
  All observations  Unemployed after 1998 
 Male  Female  Male  Female 
Variables    Coef.  Elasticity Coef. Elasticity Coef. Elasticity Coef. Elasticity 
Ln 
(pre-displaceme






(-3.70)*** 0.1892  
-0.3629 
(-4.80)*** 0.3348 





































α   0.9402*** 1.0343*** 0.9148***   1.084***
Table 6: Oaxaca Decomposition in Unemployment Duration by Gender 
  All observations  Unemployed after 1997 
Expected duration  Month  Month 
Female   55.1480
1 51.5414 
Male   45.4252 47.5146 
Males’β , females’ X 
36.0764 36.9658 
Females’β , males’ X 
54.9748 54.3538 
Gender disparities in 
expected duration 
9.7228 4.0268 
Difference due to   
Coefficients   14.3106 10.7074 
Explanatory variables  -4.5878 -6.6806 
Notes: The decomposition results are derived from the estimates presented in Table 4.    
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Appendix 
Table a1: Cox Regression Estimates of Unemployment Duration   
  From 
1993
1 
   From 
1998
2 
   
  Pooled 
regression 
















Female   0.6792  
(-5.19)*** 
   0.6915 
(-5.01)*** 
  

































































Marital status and household responsibilities 

















































































































Ownership type of the former employer 
Collective  0.9054    1.2043 0.8335 1.0978 1.3097    1.0257  
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Access to social networks 


























Job search channels 

























































































Log  likelihood  -6168.021 -2303.453 -3207.803 -5921.995 -2246.283 -3055.994
Wald test for zero slopes   
χ
2  352.55 159.15 317.67 344.33 175.31 248.96
P  value    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. observations    2134  851 1283 2071 850  1221
Notes: T statistics of the estimates are presented in parentheses. ***,** and* indicate 1, 5 and 10% 
level of significance, respectively. For dummies variables, reference groups are male, poor healthy, 
white-collar workers, not married, no children, employed in SOEs pre-displacement, non- communist 
party member, only one unemployed in one family, and relying on publicly provided job replacement 
services for job search.    
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Table a2: Weibull regression estimates of gender indicator and its interactive terms 
  All observations  Unemployed after 1997 
  Pooled regression  Pooled Regression 
  Coef. t-statistic  p-value  Coef. t-statistic p-value 
Female   0.7054   -0.29 0.769 0.5245  -0.55  0.579
Human capital endowment   
Experience   1.0243   0.53 0.599 0.9627  -0.82  0.411
Experience 
squared 
1.0004   0.38 0.703 1.0013  1.15  0.252
Education   1.1548   3.38 0.001 1.1067  2.41  0.016
Health status  0.9381    -0.22 0.824 0.7369  -1.03  0.305
Blue-collar worker   
(pre-displacement) 
0.8553   -0.76 0.444 0.8440  -0.84  0.402
Marital status and household responsibilities   
Married   0.3813   -2.85 0.004 0.6728  -1.18  0.239
Child aged 0-6      1.5683    1.03 0.304 1.1864  0.61  0.545
Child aged 7-18  0.8328    -0.64 0.519 1.4040  0.87  0.382
Child aged 19-22  0.9326    -0.23 0.820 1.2930  1.02  0.308




1.0004   0.01 0.990 0.9881  -0.36  0.721
Log(property 
income) 
1.0290   1.16 0.248 1.0539  1.78  0.075
Log(UB) 1.0331    0.85 0.398 1.0217  0.57  0.570
Log(pre-displacem
ent earnings) 
0.7693   -2.70 0.007 0.8485  -1.81  0.070
Sector employed prior to displacement   
Collective 0.6228    -2.05 0.041 0.7117  -1.47  0.141
Private firm or 
self-employed 
1.0315   0.12 0.906 1.0060  0.02  0.981
Foreign 
investment and 
joint venture   
0.6367   -1.30 0.194 0.8592  -0.46  0.646
Other ownership  1.0902    0.37 0.715 1.1031  0.42  0.673
Access to social networks 
Party member  1.2581    0.90 0.369 1.3196  1.13  0.261
More than 1 adult 
unemployed 
1.5728   0.47 0.635 0.9305  -0.08  0.939
Job search channel 
Labor market    0.7659    -0.47 0.639 0.6575  -0.74  0.462
Relatives&  friends   0.5098   -2.47 0.014 0.5998  -1.89  0.059
Self   0.8456   -0.60 0.552 0.9829  -0.06  0.951 
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Others 0.5536    -1.34 0.180 0.6277  -1.03  0.301




0.9690   -0.94 0.350 0.9923  -0.23  0.815
Share of tertiary  1.0198    1.41 0.158 1.0266  1.90  0.058
Local economic 
growth 








Log likelihood    -2230.059 -2101.421 
Likelihood ratio test for zero slopes   
χ
2   450.76 397.09 
P value      0.0000 0.0000 
Likelihood-ratio test of unobserved heterogeneity 
χ
2   4.70 2.52 
P value      0.015 0.056 
No. observations    2134 2071 
Notes: The estimates of non-interactive terms are omitted to streamline the exposition. Statistics 
presented in parentheses are t scores except forα . ***,** and* indicate 1, 5 and 10% level of 
significance, respectively. For dummies variables, reference groups are male, poor healthy, non- 
communist party member, not married, no children, only one unemployed in one family, employed in 
SOEs pre-displacement, white-collar workers, and relying on publicly provided job replacement services 
for job search.  
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Appendix 
Cover letter-for the comments of the final report 
May 20, 2007 
Dear Program Director:   
Thank you for inviting us to revise our manuscript for the PEP working Paper Series. 
We’ also thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions and 
the IDRC for offering me the access to her library databases. The kind help from Ms. 
Christine Lalande is gratefully acknowledged. . 
We have revised the paper following closely the comments and suggestions of the 
reviewers. The detail of revision is given below in accordance with the order of issues raised 
by each reviewer. 
For evaluation 1: 
1. We have updated the references. We have not only substituted the newest version for the 
old one, but also supplemented other pertinent literature. Also, we strengthened the 
introduction of the paper and motivation for the study by summarizing how our study goes 
beyond the previous literature. 
2. We expand the policy implications of gender-specific determinants of unemployment in the   
introduction. 
3. Aware of the imitations of the Weibull specification, we also estimate the Cox’s proportional 
hazards model to check the robustness of the results. This allows us to examine the 
sensitivity of parameter estimates to the somewhat arbitrary distributional assumptions 
which we have made. The results from Cox’s regression are presented in the appendix. 
The two sets of results are fairly similar. We can’t use the competing risks duration models 
due to the limitation of data. As we explained in the data section, the sample consists of 
only the currently unemployed and the re-employed, not those who experienced multiple 
change of employment status during the sample period. 
4. We’ve tried our best to find and review the pertinent literature and updated the reference. 
However, due to the limitation of library resources in China, we have no access to some 
suggested reference books (e.g. Empirical Labour Economics by Devine, T. J. and N.M. 
Kiefer, 1991; The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data by Lancaster, T, 1990).   
5. We’ve tried our best to correct typographical errors. More comparisons with non-transition 
countries are included in the discussion.  Also, we’ve turned the original tables 2 and 4 
into graphs 1 and 2, respectively. 
6. We re-wrote the sentence beginning “interacted with pre-restructuring patterns of sex 
segregation, unequal access to social assistance …” to make the statement more clear.   
7. We provided a precise definition for the dependent variable “state of unemployment” 
according to the definition of the survey in the data section.   
8. We rephrased the sentence that ended with “not straightforward”.  
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9. We explained briefly how the predicted value of UB for the re-employed is calculated.  
The possibility of underestimating the sensitivity of re-employment rate with respect to UB   
resulting from the predicted value is also discussed. 
10. Yes, women’s inflow rates are higher, except in the year of 2002 and 2003. We have 
mentioned that in the paper. 
11. We notice that in the gender disaggregated results, the re-employment for women 
workers with children 0-6 is significantly higher than those without. We discuss this result  
further on page 29. That is, in China, employers tend not to employ young women, who 
are about to enter children bearing years worrying about the adverse effect of maternity 
leaves on productivity. 
12. SOE reforms were begun in the year 1993, when workers’ earnings came to be related 
with ability, at least to some degree.   
13. Those who give up job search due to personal or family reasons are excluded from the 
sample in the survey by the NBS, China. The data we used is a special survey focusing on 
“unemployment and re-employment”. The definition of unemployment is given in the data 
section.  
14. We compared the results with other studies (both for transition economies and developed 
economies) not only in terms of duration dependence, but also in the other parts of the  
paper. 
15. The data we used in our research come from a special survey: the Unemployment and 
Re-employment Survey in Urban China. Those who work for pay for more than an hour in 
a week are classified as the employed. According to this definition, those who work less 
than 4 hours in a month are the unemployed in the dataset derived from the Urban 
Household Survey, which is a regular survey.  We calculate unemployment rates across 
regions just to identify how the tightness of labor market (indicated by local unemployment 
rate) affects re-employment rates. 
16. We provided a further explanation for the tests of hypotheses 3 and 4. 
17. We add new notes to the tables. 
For evaluation 2: 
1. Over-representation in collective sector is also a type of sex-segregation existent prior to 
the SOE restructuring.     
2. All duration models are concerned about the problem of sample selection, and this problem 
can’t be resolved within the present duration analysis framework. The data we used come 
from a special survey—the Unemployment and Re-employment Survey instead of the 
regular UHS data, both of which are conducted by N.B.S.China. We conclude that the 
aged are more likely to be laid-off, which is consistent with many other empirical works. We 
do control the age of children and the experience of the laid-off workers in the empirical 
analysis; we hope these controlled variables can also solve the aging trend problem if it 
exists.  
3. We corrected the mandatory retirement age for white collar workers.  
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4. Unfortunately, our data don’t provide information on “zhicheng” and not all workers have a 
“zhicheng”. 
5. We added notes to supplement the information. 
In addition to the changes listed above, we provided a detail explanation for job search 
intensity in the footnote 16. 
We hope that with the aforementioned changes,  we have successfully addressed all  
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